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Abstract—A source model for secret key generation between terminals is considered. Two users, namely users 1 and 
2, at one side communicate with another user, namely user 3, at the other side via a public channel where three users can 
observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources. Each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret key with user 3 where user 1 acts 
as a wiretapper for user 2 and vice versa. In this model, two situations are considered: communication from users 1 and 2 
to user 3 (the forward key strategy) and from user 3 to users 1 and 2 (the backward key strategy). In both situations, the 
goal is sharing a secret key between user 1 and user 3 while leaking no effective information about that key to user 2, and 
simultaneously, sharing another secret key between user 2 and user 3 while leaking no effective information about the 
latter key to user 1. This model is motivated by wireless communications when considering user 3 as a base station and 
users 1 and 2 as network users. In this paper, for both the forward and backward key strategies, inner and outer bounds of 
secret key capacity regions are derived. In special situations where one of users 1 and 2 is only interested in wiretapping 
and not key sharing, our results agree with that of Ahlswede and Csiszar. Also, we investigate some special cases in which 
the inner bound coincides with the outer bound and secret key capacity region is deduced.   
Keywords-Information theoretic security, secret key sharing , source model, secret key capacity region.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Because of the open nature of wireless communication networks, sharing secret keys between terminals is a 
challenging problem. In these environments, terminals have access to common randomness for generating secret keys but 
the existence of broadcast and multiple access channels in these networks results in unintended information leakage. In this 
paper, we explore the problem of sharing secret keys between three users who can observe the outputs of some correlated 
sources. There are two users, namely user 1 and user 2, at one side and another user, namely user 3, at the other side and 
also public channels between the users. User 1 wishes to share a secret key with user 3 while user 2 acts as a wiretapper 
and intends to learn information about this key as much as possible. Symmetrically, user 2 wishes to share a secret key 
with user 3 while user 1 acts as a wiretapper and intends to learn information about this key as much as possible. This  
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model could be realized in wireless environment when user 3 is a base station and users 1 and 2 are curious network users. 
The rigorous idea of information theoretic security was first introduced by Shannon in  [11] where the eavesdropper 
could listen to all the data transmitted from the transmitter to the receiver. After that, the notion of information theoretic 
security was characterized by Wyner as the wiretap channel model in which a single source-destination communication 
link is eavesdropped by a wiretapper via a degraded channel  [13]. The secrecy level was measured by equivocation rate at 
the wiretapper. It was shown in  [13] that nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved without using a secret key, if the intended 
receiver has a communication channel with better quality than the wiretapper. Csiszar and Korner in their seminal work  [2] 
generalized the Wyner’s results to less noisy and more capable channels and determined the capacity region of the 
broadcast channel with confidential message. In  [1] and  [8], generation of secret key through common randomness was 
considered by Maurer, Ahlswede and Csiszar. The common randomness can be a source or a channel type. In source 
common randomness, all terminals including the transmitter, the receiver and the wiretapper could observe i.i.d. outputs of 
correlated sources. In channel common randomness, there is a noisy broadcast channel from the transmitter to the receiver 
and the wiretapper. In both the source and channel common randomness, there is a noiseless public channel with unlimited 
capacity between the transmitter and the receiver where all communication through which can be overheard by the 
wiretapper. In  [1], based on common randomness type, the source and channel models were defined for secret key sharing 
and in both models, the problem of finding the secret key capacity between the transmitter and the receiver was 
considered. In the source model, the secret key capacity was characterized when a one-way noiseless public channel with 
unlimited capacity is available between the transmitter and the receiver. In case a two-way public channel exists between 
the transmitter and the receiver, the secret key capacity still remains an open problem, however its upper and lower bounds 
have been improved in  [5] and  [10]. Secret key generation in a network including more than three terminals has been 
explored in other works such as  [3],  [4],  [6],  [7],  [14],  [15]. Maurer  [9] strengthened the secrecy conditions of  [1] and  [8] 
and showed that the results in a weak sense can be established in the strong sense by using the techniques developed in  [9]. 
As mentioned above, the problem of sharing secret keys between terminals which have access to correlated sources 
was defined in  [1], in which the transmitter and the receiver intend to share a key via public channel communications. In 
this model, a wiretapper who has access to side information correlated with other sources, can listen to the public channel 
and obtains information about the shared key as much as possible. In this paper, we propose a new model which differs 
from the source model of  [1] (which was described in the previous paragraph), in such a way that both users 1 and 2 
attempt to share secret keys with user 3 while user 1 is the wiretapper of user 2’s secret key and vice versa. Three users 
have access to correlated sources and there is a public channel from users 1 and 2 to user 3. To the best of our knowledge, 
this model has not been investigated so far. For this model, we investigate two situations.  In the first, there is a one-way 
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public channel from users 1 and 2 to user 3. This situation is referred to as the forward key strategy and is shown in Fig.1.  
In the second one, there is a one-way public channel from user 3 to users 1 and 2. This situation is referred to as the 
backward key strategy and is shown in Fig.2. In both situations, we investigate the inner and outer bounds of the secret key 
capacity region. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II the proposed model and definitions are described. In Section 
III, related theorems for the upper and lower bounds of the secret key capacity regions are given. Some special cases are 
considered in Section IV in which the inner bound coincides with the outer bound and the secret key capacity region can 
be derived. Proofs of the theorems are given in Section V. Conclusion and suggestions for future works are given in 
Section VI. Some lemmas useful for the proof of theorems are given and proofed in the appendix. Throughout the paper, a 
random variable is denoted with an upper case letter (e.g X ) and its realization is denoted with the corresponding lower 
case letter (e.g., x ). We use NiX to indicate vector ,1 ,2 ,( , ,..., )i i i NX X X , and use ,
k
i jX to indicate vector 
, , 1 ,( , ,..., )i j i j i kX X X where i denotes the index of the corresponding user. 
II. THE NEW SOURCE MODEL  
Users 1, 2 and 3 can, respectively, observe N i.i.d. repetitions of the random variables 1 2,X X and 3X . The random 
variable iX takes values from the finite set i for 1, 2,3i  . Furthermore, a noiseless public channel with unlimited 
capacity is available for communication between the three users. User 1 wishes to share a secret key with user 3 while user 
2 acts as a wiretapper of user 1’s key. Symmetrically and simultaneously, user 2 wishes to share a secret key with user 3 
while user 1 acts as a wiretapper of user 2’s key. Now, we represent formal definition of the secret key strategy for the new 
source model.  
Step 0) Users 1, 2 and 3, respectively, generate random variables 1M , 2M  and 3M independent of each other such 
that 1 2 3, ,M M M and 1 2 3( , , )N N NX X X are mutually independent. The next steps can be regarded as deterministic. 
Step 1) At this step, users 1, 2 and 3, respectively, generate 1,1F , 2,1F  and 3,1F such that ,1 ,1( , )Ni i i iF f M X for 1,2,3i   and 
transmit them over the public channel. 
Steps 2 to k) At step j , user i generates ,i jF as a function of ( , )
N
i iM X and the information which has been received from 
the other users via the public channel. Hence, users 1, 2 and 3, respectively, generate 1, jF , 2, jF  and 3, jF  as functions of the 
information available at the corresponding user where 1 11, 1, 1 1 2,1 3,1( , , , )
N j j
j jF f M X F F
  , 1 12, 2, 2 2 1,1 3,1( , , , )N j jj jF f M X F F   and  
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1 1
3, 3, 3 3 1,1 2,1( , , , )
N j j
j jF f M X F F
   , and transmit them over the public channel for 2,...,j k .  
Finally, after k steps, users 1 and 2 compute the keys K  and L , respectively, as functions of the information available at 
each user: 
1 1 2,1 3,1
2 2 1,1 3,1
( , , , )                                        (1)
( , , , )                                          (2)
N k k
N k k
K K M X F F
L L M X F F


 
and also user 3 computes the keys Kˆ  and Lˆ  as a function of the information available at him: 
3 3 1,1 2,1
3 3 1,1 2,1
ˆ ˆ ( , , , )                                        (3)
ˆ ˆ( , , , )                                          (4)  
N k k
N k k
K K M X F F
L L M X F F



where the keys Kˆ and Lˆ  are intended for sharing as secret keys with users 1 and 2, respectively. The keys 
ˆ( , )K K and ˆ( , )L L take values from the finite sets  and , respectively. 
Now we state the conditions that should be met in the secret key strategy of the described model. 
 
Fig.1. Forward key strategy  
 
Fig.2. Backward key strategy 
Definition 1: In the secret key strategy of the source model described above, the secret key rate pair 1 2( , )R R is an 
achievable rate pair if for every 0  and sufficiently large N , we have: 
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1
2 2 1,1 3,1
1
1 1 2,1 3,1
ˆ ˆPr{ }   and Pr{ }                              (5)
( , , , ; )                                        (6)   
( , , , ; )                                         (7)
N k k
N
N k k
N
K K L L
I M X F F K
I M X F F L
 


   


1 1
1 2
1 1
1 1
( )  and ( )                         (8) 
log ( )                                                  (9)  
log ( )                                                   (10)
N N
N N
N N
H K R H L R
H K
H L
 


   
 
 


 
Equation (5) means that users 1 and 2 can generate secret keys with user 3 and Equations (6) and (7) say that users 1 
and 2 have effectively no information about each other’s secret key. Equations (9) and (10) are the uniformity conditions 
for the secret keys.  
Definition 2: The region containing all the achievable secret key rate pairs 1 2( , )R R is the key capacity region.  
In the described model, we consider restricted usage of the public channel, i.e., no more than k usages of the public 
channel are allowed. In this paper, only the case 1k   is investigated. For this case, when communication is only 
performed from users 1 and 2 to user 3, forward key capacity region is defined and when communication is only carried 
out in the reverse direction, i.e., from user 3 to users 1 and 2, backward key capacity region is introduced. We consider 
both situations in this paper. 
III. SECRET KEY RATE REGIONS 
In this section, we state our main results about the mentioned model. 
Theorem 1 (inner bound of the forward key capacity region): In the forward key strategy of the described source 
model, the rate pair 1 2( , )R R is an achievable key rate pair if:  
1 2
1 3 2
2 3 1
1 2 3 2 1
0, 0
( ; , ) ( ; , )
( ; , ) ( ; , )
( , ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
R R
R I S X T U I S X T U
R I T X S V I T X S V
R R I S T X U V I S X T U I T X S V I S T U V
 
 
 
    
 
where , , ,U V S T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution: 
1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3( , , , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , )p u v s t x x x p u s p v t p s x p t x p x x x .  
Proof of the achievability is given in Section V. A. However, we explain the intuitive interpretation of Theorem 1. We 
 assume that users 1 and 2 consider the random variables S and  T with the distributions 1( )p s x  and 2( )p t x for sharing 
keys with user 3, respectively. These random variables should be decoded by user 3 for generating secret keys. To this end, 
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part of information is sent by users 1 and 2 by transmitting realizations of random variables U and  V  with distributions 
( )p u s  and ( )p v t , respectively. Then, the other part of information should be sent by users 1 and 2 with total rate 
3( , , , )H S T U V X , according to the Slepian-Wolf theorem, to enable user 3 to reconstruct S and  T . Based on the portion 
of the rate transmitted by each user, there is a tradeoff between the equivocation rates. For justification of the rate 1R , we 
assume that user 1 sends information with the minimum rate 3( , , , )H S U V X T after sending realizations of U . It is 
obvious that both of the transmissions by user 1 can result in information leakage about S to user 2. The leakage rate 
would be equal to: 
2 3( ; , ) ( , , , )I S X U H S U V X T  
 For obtaining 1R , we should subtract the leakage rate from ( )H S and hence, we have: 
( )
1 2 3 3 2 3 2
( )
3 2 3 2
( ) ( ; , ) ( , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , , ) ( ; , )
( ; , , ) ( ; , , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
a
b
R H S I S X U H S U V X T I S U V X T I S X U I S U X T I S X U
I S U X T I S X U T I S X T U I S X T U
      
   
 
where (a) follows from the distribution of  V and (b) from the distribution of  T that results in 2( ; , ) 0I S T X U  . Since 
the minimum rate 3( , , , )H S U V X T (according to the Slepian–Wolf theorem) is sent by user 1, 1R is smaller than the 
calculated rate. The same approach can be applied to the rate 2R . For the rate 1 2R R : 
1 2 2 1 3
3 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( , , , )
( , ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
R R H S H T I S X U I T X V H S T U V X
I S T X U V I S X T U I T X S V I S T U V
     
     
Theorem 2 (outer bound of the forward key capacity region): If the rate pair 1 2( , )R R is an achievable key rate pair in 
the forward secret key strategy, then it satisfies: 
1 2
1 3 2
2 3 1
0, 0
{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}
{ ( ; , ) ( ; )}
R R
R I S T X U I S X U
R I T S X V I T X V
 
 
 
  
for random variables , , ,U V S T  which take values in sufficiently large finite sets and form Markov chains as:  
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
2 1 3
( , , , , ),
( , , , , ),
( , ),
( , )
U S V T X X X
V T U S X X X
S X X X
T X X X
 
 
 
 
. 
In addition, the following bound is an explicit upper bound which can be easily deduced from Theorem 1 of  [1]: 
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1 1 3 2
2 2 3 1
( ; )
( ; )
R I X X X
R I X X X

  
The proof is given in Section V. B. 
Corollary 1: If user 2 is only interested in wiretapping and not sharing a secret key with user 3, random variables 
T and V can be assumed to be constant. In this case, the lower bound of Theorem 1 coincides with the upper bound of 
Theorem 2 and the forward secret key capacity between the users 1 and 3 would be equal to: 
1 3 2max{ ( ; ) ( ; )}R I S X U I S X U   
for random variables ,U S  which form a Markov chain as 1 2 3,U S X X X   . This result is in agreement with the result of 
Theorem 1 of  [1].    
Theorem 3 (inner bound of the backward key capacity region): In the backward secret key strategy of the described 
source model, the rate pair 1 2( , )R R is an achievable key rate pair if: 
1 2
1 1 2
2 2 1
0, 0
{ ( ; ) ( ; , )}
{ ( ; ) ( ; , )}
R R
R I S X U I S X T U
R I T X U I T X S U
 
 
 
 
where ,U S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution: 
1 2 3 3 1 2 3( , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , )p u s t x x x p u s t p s t x p x x x . 
The proof is given in Section V. C. Intuitive interpretation of Theorem 3 is as follows. In the case of backward key 
capacity region, only user 3 is permitted to send information to users 1 and 2. In this case, user 3 considers two random 
variables ,S T  with distribution 3( , )p s t x and intends to send required information so that users 1 and 2 can reconstruct 
random variables S and T , respectively, and then user 3 exploits these random variables for sharing secret keys with 
these users. First, it transmits realizations of random variable U which has distribution ( , )p u s t and then sends information 
with rate 1( , )H S X U so that user 1 can reconstruct S and information with rate 2( , )H T X U  so that user 2 can 
reconstruct T . Consequently, user 2 has access to random variables 2 , ,X U T  and also information with rate 
1( , )H S X U for obtaining information about user 1’s key. So: 
1 2 1 1 2 1 2( ) ( ; , , ) ( , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , , ) ( ; ) ( ; , )R H S I S X U T H S U X I S U X I S X U T I S X U I S X T U        
With the same approach the rate 2R  can be deduced. 
8 
 
Theorem 4 (outer bound of the backward key capacity region): In the backward secret key strategy of the described 
source model, if the rate pair 1 2( , )R R is an achievable key rate pair, then it satisfies: 
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 1
0, 0
min{ ( ; ) ( ; ), ( ; , ) ( ; , )}
min{ ( ; ) ( ; ), ( ; , ) ( ; , )}
R R
R I S X U I S X U I S X T U I S X T U
R I T X U I T X U I T X S U I T X S U
 
  
  
  
where ,U S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 
1 2 3 3 1 2 3( , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , )p u s t x x x p u s t p s t x p x x x which form Markov chains as 3U S X  and 3U T X  . 
In addition, the following bound is an explicit upper bound which can be easily deduced from Theorem 1 of  [1]: 
1 1 3 2
2 2 3 1
( ; )
( ; )
R I X X X
R I X X X

  
The proof is given in Section V. D.  
 Corollary 2: If user 2 is only interested in wiretapping and not sharing a secret key, the random variable T can be 
assumed to be constant. In this case, the lower bound of Theorem 3 coincides with the upper bound of Theorem 4 and the 
backward secret key capacity between user 1 and 3 would be equal to: 
1 1 2max{ ( ; ) ( ; )}R I S X U I S X U   
for the random variables which form Markov chain as 3 1 2,U S X X X   . This result is in agreement with the result of 
Theorem 1 of  [1].      
IV. SPECIAL CASES 
In his section, we discuss some special cases in which the secret key capacity region can be found.  
Case 1: When sources 1 2,X X and 3X form a Markov chain as 1 2 3X X X  , then the forward and backward key 
capacity regions reduce to: 
1
2 2 3 1
0
0 ( ; )
R
R I X X X

   
The achievability is obtained by replacing 1 2, ,S X T X U V      in Theorem 1 and 3 ,T X S U    in 
Theorem 3. It should be noted that because of the above Markov chain, the equality 
2 3 1 3 2 3 1( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )I X X I X X I X X X  holds. For the converse part of the forward and backward key capacity regions, we 
directly exploit Theorems 2 and 4, respectively . 
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When sources 1 2,X X and 3X form a Markov chain as 2 1 3X X X  , the secret key capacity region can be derived by 
symmetry from case 1.   
Case 2: When sources 1 2,X X and 3X form a Markov chain as 1 3 2X X X  , then the forward key capacity region 
reduces to: 
1 1 3 2
2 2 3 1
0 ( ; )
0 ( ; )
R I X X X
R I X X X
 
   
The achievability is obtained by replacing 1 2, ,S X T X U V      in Theorem 1. It should be noted that because 
of the above Markov chain, the equalities 1 3 2 1 1 3 2( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )I X X I X X I X X X  and 
2 3 2 1 2 3 1( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )I X X I X X I X X X   hold. The converse part can be directly followed from Theorem 2.  
Case 3: When sources 1 2,X X and 3X form a Markov chain as 1 3 2X X X  , then the backward key capacity region 
reduces to: 
1 2
1 1 2
2 2 1
0, 0
( ; ) ( ; )
( ; ) ( ; )
R R
R I S X U I S X U
R I T X U I T X U
 
 
 
 
where U , S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 
1 2 3 3 1 2 3( , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , )p u s t x x x p u s t p s t x p x x x which form Markov chains as: 
3
3
1 2
U S X
U T X
S X X T
 
 
  
 
The existence of such random variables S and T can be deduced from the Markov chain 1 3 2X X X  . This situation 
is shown in Fig.3. For these random variables, we have 1 2( ; , ) ( ; , ) 0I S T X U I S T X U   and so, achievability can be deduced 
from Theorem 3. The converse part can be directly deduced from Theorem 2. 
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Fig.3. An example for the case 1 3 2X X X   
V. PROOFS 
In this section, proofs of the theorems in Section III are given. 
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 
Construction of the Codebooks 
First, we describe random codebook generation at users 1 and 2. For a distribution ( )p s , collection of codewords Ns , 
each uniformly drawn from the set 
1
( )N ST P , is generated by user 1. 1 ( )
N
ST P denotes the set of jointly typical sequences 
Ns . 
Similarly, for a distribution ( )p t , collection of codewords Nt , each uniformly drawn from the set 
1
( )N TT P , is generated by 
user 2. Now, for a fixed distribution ( )p u s , user 1 generates 2( ( ; ) )2N I S U    i.i.d. codewords of length N , ( )NU a for   
2( ( ; ) ){1,..., 2 }N I S Ua  with distribution ( )p u . Similarly, for a fixed distribution ( )p v t , user 2 generates 2( ( ; ) )2N I T V  i.i.d. 
codewords of length N , ( )NV b for 2( ( ; ) ){1,..., 2 }N I T Vb  with distribution ( )p v .  
User 1 divides the typical sequences Ns  into 12NR bins with the same size in a uniformly random manner where 
1 2 1( ( , ) )R H S X U R   . The index of each bin is denoted as k  and the corresponding random variable is denoted as K  . 
Also the codewords of each bin are randomly divided into 12NR bins with the same size and the bin index of the latter bins is 
denoted as k  with the corresponding random variable K . It is obvious that in each internal bin with bin index k , there 
are 12NR  typical sequences Ns where 1 2 1( ( ; , ) )R I S X U    which we use index k  for them. Hence each typical 
codeword Ns can be uniquely determined with three indices as   , ,
N
k k ks    and vice versa. Similarly, user 2 divides the typical 
sequences of Nt  into 22NR bins with the same size in a uniformly random manner where 2 1 2( ( , ) )R H T X V R   . The bin 
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index of each bin is denoted as l and the corresponding random variable is denoted as L . Also the codewords of each bin 
are randomly divided into 22NR bins with the same size and the bin index of the latter bins is denoted as l  with the 
corresponding random variable L . It is obvious that in each internal bin with bin index l , there are 22NR  typical 
sequences Nt where 2 1 1( ; , )R I T X V    which we use index l for them. Hence each typical codeword Nt can be 
uniquely determined with three indices as , ,
N
l l lt    and vice versa. 
Now, for every typical 1 1
N NX x , all codewords Ns which are jointly typical with 1Nx , based on distribution 1( )p s x , 
are collected in a set which is denoted as
1
N
N
x
S . In the same manner, for every typical 2 2
N NX x , all codewords Nt which are 
jointly typical whith 2
Nx , based on distribution 2( )p t x , are collected in a set which is denoted as
2
N
N
x
T . The codebooks of 
users 1 and 2 for 1 1
N NX x and 2 2N NX x are shown in Fig.4. It is assumed that all the users are informed of the binning 
schemes and distributions used. 
          k      
k               
1 2 • • • 12NR
 
1 •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
2 •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
 • •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
12NR  •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
1
N
N
x
S : Set of user 1’s codewords for 1 1
N NX x  
            l    
l            
1 2 • • • 22NR
 
1 •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
2 •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
22NR  •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• •••• 
2
N
N
x
T : Set of user 2’s codewords for 2 2
N NX x  
Fig.4. Codebooks of users 1 and 2 for 1 1
N NX x and 2 2N NX x   
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Encoding 
For encoding, users 1 and 2 observe the i.i.d. sequences 1NX and 2
NX , e.g., 1Nx and 2
Nx , respectively, and select the 
corresponding sets 
1
N
N
x
S and 
2
N
N
x
T . User 1 randomly selects a sequence Ns from the set 
1
N
N
x
S  and chooses the respective row 
index ( k ) of the codeword (as shown in Fig.4) as secret key with user 3 and sends the respective column index ( k  ) of the 
codeword over the public channel. He also sends index a of its jointly typical sequence ( )NU a over the public channel. 
Similarly, user 2 randomly selects a sequence Nt from the set 
2
N
N
x
T  and chooses the respective row index ( l ) of the 
codeword (as shown in Fig.4) as secret key with user 3 and sends the respective column index ( l ) of the codeword over 
the public channel. He also sends the index b of its jointly typical sequence ( )NV b over the public channel.  
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis 
For decoding, user 3 receives the indices , , ,k a l b  from the public channel and also observes the i.i.d. sequences 3NX  
e.g., 3Nx . User 3 decodes the pair , , , ,( , )
N N
k k k l l ls t    if: 
0 3
( )
, , , , 3 , , ,( , , ) ( )
N N N N
k k k l l l S T X U Vs t x T P      
when such pair , , , ,( , )
N N
k k k l l ls t    exists and is unique and otherwise, he declares error. After decoding such , , , ,( , )
N N
k k k l l ls t    , user 
3 chooses the indices k and l as secret keys with users 1 and 2, respectively. 
Now, we analyze the decoding probability of error. Without loss of generality, we assume that the codewords 1,1,1
Ns and 
1,1,1
Nt are, respectively, chosen by users 1 and 2 and so the key pair 1,1,1 1,1,1( , )
N Ns t should be decoded by user 3. The event E is 
defined as: 
0 3
( )
, , , , 3 , , ,( , , , , , ) {( , , ) ( )}
N N N N
k k k l l l S T X U VE k k k l l l s t x T P         
The decoding error probability is bounded as: 
( ) c
1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1
( , ) (1,1),( , ) (1,1)
1,1,1 1,1,1 1,
( , ) (1,1)
{ (1,1,1,1,1,1) ( , )chosen} { ( ,1, , ,1, ) ( , )chosen}
{ ( ,1, ,1,1,1) ( , )chosen} { (1,1,1, ,1, ) (
N N N N N
e
k k l l
N N
k k
P P E s t P E k k l l s t
P E k k s t P E l l s
  
 
  
  

 1,1 1,1,1
( , ) (1,1)
, )chosen}N N
l l
t
 
  
The first term vanishes due to the joint asymptotic equipartition property (AEP): 
c
0{ (1,1,1,1,1,1) ( , ) (1,1)sent}P E k l    
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In the second term for ( , ) (1,1)k k   and ( , ) (1,1)l l  we have (according to the Slepian-Wolf Theorem  [12]) 
1 2 3 0( ( , , , ) ){ ( ,1, , ,1, ) ( , ) (1,1)sent} 2 R R N H S T X U VP E k k l l k l          
In the third term for ( , ) (1,1)k k   we have: 
1 3 0 1 3 0( ( , , , ) ) ( ( , , ) ){ ( ,1, ,1,1,1) ( , ) (1,1)sent} 2 2R N H S X T U V R N H S X T UP E k k k l             
Finally, in the forth term for ( , ) (1,1)l l  we have: 
2 3 0 2 3 0( ( , , , ) ) ( ( , , ) ){ (1,1,1, ,1, ) ( , ) (1,1)sent} 2 2R N H T X S U V R N H T X S VP E l l k l             
and hence,  the decoding error probability can be bounded as: 
1 2 3 0 1 3 0 2 3 0( ( , , , ) ) ( ( , , ) ) ( ( , , ) )( )
0 2 2 2
N R R H S T X U V N R H S X T U N R H T X S VN
eP
                    
If we set: 
1 3
2 3
1 2 3
( , , )
( , , )
( , , , )
R H S X T U
R H T X S V
R R H S T X U V
 
 
  
 
or in other words: 
(a)
1 2 3 2 3 3 2
(b)
2 1 3 1 3 3 1
1 2 2 1 3 3 2
( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , , , ) ( , ; , ) ( ; , )
R H S X U H S X T U H S X T U H S X T U I S X T U I S X T U
R H T X V H T X S V H T X S V H T X S V I T X S V I T X S V
R R H S X U H T X V H S T X U V I S T X U V I S X T U I
     
     
       1( ; , ) ( ; , )T X S V I S T U V
            
then for any 0 0  , ( ) 04NeP  and if we set 04  , then the reliability condition 5 in Definition 1 will be satisfied. It 
should be noted that in the above equations, equalities (a) and (b) follow from the distributions of random variable S  and 
T . It is obvious that the encoding scheme can satisfy the uniformity conditions (9) and (10) in Definition 1. 
Analysis of Security Conditions  
Now, we should analyze the security conditions (6) and (7) in Definition 1. User 2 attempts to obtain information about 
user 1’s key and to this end, he exploits 2 2
NM , X and the information which is sent by user 1 on the public channel: 
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(a)
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
(b)
2 2
2
( ; , , , ) ( ; , , ) ( ) ( , , )
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , , )
( ) ( , , ) ( , , , )
( , )
N N N N N N
N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
I K M X K U I K X K U H K H K X K U
H K H K S X K U H S K X K U
H K H K X K U S H S X K U H S K X K U
H K H S X K U H S K X K U
NH S X U N
    
   
     
   
  1 2 2
(c)
2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
( , , ) ( , , , )
( , ) ( , , ) ( , , , )
( ; , ) ( , , , )
( , ) ( , , ) ( , , , )
( ) (
N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N
R H S X K U H S K X K U
H S X U N NR H S X K U H S K X K U
I S K X U NR H S K X K U N
H K X U H K S X U NR H S K X K U N
H K H K S



  
       
      
        
   2 1 2 1
(d)
1 2 1
2 1
(e)
1 2
, , ) ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )
( , , , )
( )
N N N N N
N N N
N N N
X U NR H S K X K U N
H K NR H S K X K U N
H S K X K U N
N



 
    
      
  
    
In the above equations, (a) follows from the independence of 2M from other random variables, (b) from the fact that 
the index k is one of the indices of Ns and the equality 2( , , , ) 0
N N NH K X K U S  holds. For proving (c), we use Lemma 
1 which is given in part A of the Appendix. Equality (d) is true because the index k  is also one of the indices of Ns . 
Finally for (e), we use Lemma 2 (which is given in part B of the Appendix) to show that: 
2 2( , , , )
N N NH S K X K U N  . 
Similarly, the security condition for user 2’s key is satisfied as: 
1 1 3 4( ; , , , ) ( )
N NI L M X L V N       
and so, the security conditions (6) and (7) of Definition 1 are satisfied when 1 1 2 3 4
2i
,i , , ,    . 
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 
For deriving upper bound of the forward key capacity region, we use the reliable and secure transmission conditions. In 
the forward key strategy, users 1 and 2, respectively, generate the keys K and L  for sharing with user 3: 
1 1 2 2( , ), ( , ) N NK K M X L L M X  
Then, users 1 and 2, respectively, generate 1F and 2F where 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ), ( , )N NF f M X F f M X   and transmit them over the 
public channel so that user 3 can reconstruct K  and L  with an arbitrary probability of error 0  . According to Fano’s 
inequality:  
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3 3 1 2 1
1 ( , , , , ) ( ) (log 1)NH K L M X F F H
N
        
After reconstructing these keys, user 3 uses K and L as secret keys with users 1 and 2, respectively, and for arbitrarily 
small 0  , the following security conditions should be satisfied: 
2 2 1
1 1 2
( ; , , ) . ,
( ; , , ) .  
N
N
I K M X F N
I L M X F N




 
Now, we show that for keys that satisfy the reliability and security conditions described above, there exist random 
variables , , ,U V S T that form Markov chains as mentioned in Theorem 2 and satisfy the following relations: 
3 2
3 1
( ) ( ; , ) ( ; )
( ) ( ; , ) ( ; )
H K I S T X U I S X U
H L I T S X V I T X V


  
    
We prove upper bound for 1R . The proof for 2R can be deduced by symmetry.  
(a)
2 2 1
(b)
2 2 1 3 3 1 2 1
(c)
2 1 3 1 2 1
3 2 1 2 1 1
(d)
1
3, 2 3,1 2, 1 1 2,
1
1 1( ) ( , , )
1 1( , , ) ( , , , , )
1 1( , ) ( , , , )  
1 [ ( ; , , ) ( ; )]
1 [ ( ; , , , , ) ( ;
N
N N
N N
N N
N
i N
i i
i
H K H K M X F
N N
H K M X F H K M X F F L
N N
H K X F H K X F F L
N N
I K X F L F I K X F
N
I K X F L X X F I K X
N

 
 
 



 
   
   
   
  13,1 2, 1 1 1
(e)
3, 2, 1
1
(f)
3, 2,
, , )]
1 [ ( ; , ) ( ; )]
[ ( ; , )- ( ; )]
i N
i i
N
i i i i i i i
i
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
X X F
I S T X U I S X U
N
I S T X U I S X U
 
 




 
   
 

 
where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from Fano’s inequality, (c) from independence of 2 3( , )M M  from other 
random variables, (d) from Lemma 3 (which is given in part C of the Appendix), (e) from definition of the random 
variables U ,V ,S ,T as: 
1 1
3,1 2, 1 1 3,1 1, 1 2( , , ), ( , , ), ( , ), ( , )
i N i N
i i i i i i i iU X X F V X X F S K U T L V
 
      
and (f) from definition of the random variable Q which is uniformly distributed on {1 2 }, ,..., N and setting 1     . 
Similarly, by using the above mentioned variables we have: 
2 3, 1,
1 ( ) [ ( ; , )- ( ; )]Q Q Q Q Q Q QR H L I T S X V I T X VN
     
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It can be seen that the desired equations are satisfied with random variables which form Markov chains as in Theorem 
2. 
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 
Construction of the Codebooks 
First, we describe random codebook generation at user 3. For a distribution ( , )p s t , collection of codewords, ( , )N Ns t  
each uniformly drawn from the set 
1 ,( )
N
S TT P , is generated by user 3. Now, for a fixed distribution ( , )p u s t , user 3 
generates 2( ( , ; ) )2N I S T U    i.i.d. codewords of length N , ( )NU a for   2( ( , ; ) ){1,..., 2 }N I S T Ua  with distribution ( )p u .  
User 3 divides the typical sequences of Ns into 12NR bins with the same size in a uniformly random manner where 
1 2 1( ( , , ) )R H S X T U R   . The bin index of each bin is denoted as k  and the corresponding random variable is denoted 
as K  . Also the codewords of each bin are randomly divided into 12NR bins with the same size and the bin index of the latter 
bins is denoted as k  with the corresponding random variable K . It is obvious that in each internal bin with bin index k , 
there are 12NR  typical sequences Ns where 1 2 1( ( ; , , ) )R I S X T U    which we use index k  for them. Hence each typical 
codeword Ns can be uniquely determined with three indices as   , ,
N
k k ks    and vice versa. Also, user 3 divides typical 
sequences of Nt  into 22NR bins with the same size in a uniformly random manner where 2 1 2( ( , , ) )R H T X S U R   . The 
bin index of each bin is denoted as l and the corresponding random variable is denoted as L . Also the codewords of each 
bin are randomly divided into 22NR bins with the same size and the bin index of the latter bins is denoted as l  with the 
corresponding random variable L . It is obvious that in each internal bin with bin index l , there are 22NR  typical 
sequences Nt  where 2 1 1( ( ; , , ) )R I T X S U    which we use index l for them. Hence each typical codeword Nt can be 
uniquely determined with three indices as , ,
N
l l lt    and vice versa. 
Now, for every typical 3 3
N NX x , all codewords ( , )N Ns t which are jointly typical with 3Nx , based on distribution 
3( , )p s t x , are collected in a set which is denoted as
3
( , ) NN N xS T . It is assumed that all the users are informed of the binning 
schemes and distributions used.  
Encoding 
For encoding, user 3 observes the i.i.d. sequence of 3NX e.g., 3Nx and after selecting the corresponding set 3( , ) N
N N
xS T ,  
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he randomly selects a sequence ( , )N Ns t from this set.  Then, he chooses the respective row index ( k ) of the codeword 
Ns  (as shown in Fig.4) as secret key with user 1 and sends the respective column index ( k  ) of the codeword over the 
public channel. Also, he chooses the respective row index ( l ) of the codeword Nt  (as shown in Fig.4) as secret key with 
user 2 and sends the respective column index ( l ) of the codeword over the public channel. In addition, user 3 sends index 
a of ( )NU a  which is jointly typical with the sequence ( , )N Ns t over the public channel.  
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis 
For decoding, users 1 and 2 receive the indices , ,k l a  from the public channel and also observe the i.i.d. sequences 
1
NX  and 2NX e.g., 1Nx  and 2Nx , respectively. User 1 decodes , ,
N
k k ks    if: 
0 1
( )
, , 1 ,( , ) ( )
N N N
k k k S X Us x T P    
when such , ,
N
k k ks    exists and is unique and otherwise he declares error. User 2 decodes , ,
N
l l lt    if: 
0 2
( )
, , 2 ,( , ) ( )
N N N
l l l T X Ut x T P    
when such , ,
N
l l lt    exists and is unique and otherwise he declares error. 
Now we analyze decoding error probability. We define:  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2max{ , }
N N N
e e eP P P  
where ( )1
N
eP and
( )
2
N
eP  are, respectively, decoding error probabilities at users 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, we assume 
that the codewords 1,1,1
Ns and 1,1,1
Nt are chosen by user 3 and so, 1,1,1
Ns  and 1,1,1
Nt  should be decoded by users 1 and 2, 
respectively. Events 1E  and 2E  are defined as: 
0 1
( )
1 , , 1 ,( , , ) {( , ) ( )}
N N N
k k k S X UE k k k s x T P     
0 2
( )
2 , , 2 ,( , , ) {( , ) ( )}
N N N
l l l T X UE l l l t x T P     
The decoding error probabilities are bounded as: 
( ) c
1 1 1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1
( , ) (1,1)
( ) c
2 2 1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1 1,1,1
( , ) (1,1)
{ (1,1,1) ( , )chosen} { ( ,1, ) ( , )chosen}
{ (1,1,1) ( , )chosen} { ( ,1, ) ( , )chosen}
N N N N N
e
k k
N N N N N
e
l l
P P E s t P E k k s t
P P E s t P E l l s t
 
 
 
 

  
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According to the joint asymptotic equipartition property (AEP), decoding error probabilities can be bounded as: 
1 1 0
12 2 0
( ( , ) )( )
1 0
( ( , ) )( )
2 0
2
2
R N H S X UN
e
R N H T X UN
e
P
P




  
  
 
 
 
and if we set: 
1 1
2 2
( , )
( , )
R H S X U
R H T X U
 
   
or in other words: 
1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
( , , ) ( , ) ( ; ) ( ; , )
( , , ) ( , ) ( ; ) ( ; , )
R H S X T U H S X U I S X U I S X T U
R H T X S U H T X V I T X U I T X S U
   
     
then for any 0 0  , ( ) 02NeiP   for 1, 2i  and so ( ) 02NeP  and if we set 02  , then the reliability condition 5 in 
Definition 1 will be satisfied. It is obvious that the encoding scheme can satisfy the uniformity conditions (9) and (10) in 
Definition 1. 
Analysis of Security Conditions 
Now, we should analyze the security conditions (6) and (7) in Definition 1. User 2 attempts to obtain information about 
user 1’s key and to this end, he exploits 2 2
NM , X and the information which is sent by user 3 over the public channel, i.e., 
the indices k  , l and a : 
(a)
2 2 2 2 2 2
(b)
2 2
2 2
2
( ; , , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , )
( ; , , , ) ( ) ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
( ) (
N N N N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N
I K M X K L U I K X K L U I K X K L T U I K X K T U I K L X K T U
I K X K T U H K H K X K T U
H K H K S X K T U H S K X K T U
H K H K X
           
   
   
  2 2
(c)
2 2
2 1 2 2
(d)
2 1 1 2
, , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( , , ) ( , , , )
N N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
K T U S H S X K T U H S K X K T U
H K H S X K T U H S K X K T U
NH S X T U NR H S X K T U H S K X K T U
H S X T U N NR H S X K T U H
   
   
     
       2
2 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
(e)
1
( , , , , )
( ; , , ) ( , , , , )
( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( ) (
N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
S K X K T U
I S K X T U NR H S K X K T U N
H K X T U H K S X T U NR H S K X K T U N
H K H K S X T U NR H S K X K T U N
H K NR H




      
        
        
    2 1
2 1
(f )
1 2
, , , , )
( , , , , )
( )
N N N N
N N N N
S K X K T U N
H S K X K T U N
N


 
 
  
    
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In above equations, (a) follows from the independence of 2M from other random variables, (b) from the fact that given 
NT , L  is impendent of other random variables, (c) from the fact that the index k is one of the indices of Ns and the 
equality 2( , , , , ) 0
N N N NH K X K T U S  holds. For proving (d), we use the same approach as in Lemma 1 which is given 
in part A of the Appendix. Equality (e) is true because the index k  is also one of the indices of Ns . Finally for (f), we use 
the same approach as in Lemma 2 (which is given in part B of the Appendix) to show that: 
2 2( , , , , )
N N N NH S K X K T U N  . 
Similarly, the security condition for user 2’s key is satisfied as: 
1 1 3 4( ; , , , , ) ( )
N NI L M X K L U N        
and so, the security conditions (6) and (7) of Definition 1 are satisfied when 1 1 2 3 4
2i
,i , , ,    . 
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 4 
For deriving upper bounds of the backward key capacity region, we use the reliable and secure transmission conditions. 
In the backward key strategy, user 3 generates the keys K and L  for sharing with users 1 and 2, respectively: 
3 3 3 3( , ), ( , )
N NK K M X L L M X      
Also, it sends 3F  over the public channel where 3 3 3 3( , )
NF f M X  to enable users 1 and 2 to compute K  and L , 
respectively, with an arbitrary probability of error 0  . According to Fano’s inequality: 
1 1 3 1
2 2 3 2
1 ( , , ) ( ) (log 1) ,
1 ( , , ) ( ) (log 1)  
N
N
H K M X F H
N
H L M X F H
N
  
  
  
  




 
Also the security conditions require that: 
2 2 3
1 1 3
( ; , , ) ,
( ; , , )
N
N
I K M X F N
I L M X F N



  
Now, we derive upper bounds for 1R . The proofs for 2R can be deduced by symmetry. For the first upper bound of 
1R : 
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(a)
2 2 3
(b)
2 2 3 1 1 3 1
(c)
2 3 1 3 1
1 3 2 3 1
(d)
1 1
1, 1 2, 1 3 2, 1 2, 1 3 1
1
1 1( ) ( , , )
1 [ ( , , ) ( , , )]
1 [ ( , ) ( , )]
1 [ ( ; ) ( ; )]
1 [ ( ; , , ) ( ; , , )]
N
N N
N N
N N
N
i N i N
i i i i
i
H K H K M X F
N N
H K M X F H K M X F
N
H K X F H K X F
N
I K X F I K X F
N
I K X X X F I K X X X F
N

 
 
 
  

 
   
   
   
  
(e)
1, 2, 1
1
(f)
1, 2,
1 [ ( ; )] ( ; )]
[ ( ; )- ( ; )]
N
i i i i i i
i
Q Q Q Q Q Q
I S X U I S X U
N
I S X U I S X U

 



   
 

 
where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from Fano’s inequality at user 1, (c) from independence of 1 2( , )M M  
from other random variables, (d) from Lemma 3 (in which the random variable 2F is set to be constant), (e) from 
definition of the random variables U ,S ,T as: 
1
1 2, 1 3( , , ),  ( , ),  ( , )
i N
i i i i i iU X X F S K U T L U

   and (f) from definition of the random variable Q which is uniformly 
distributed on {1 2 }, ,..., N and setting 1     .  
For the second upper bound of 1R , we have: 
(a)
2 2 3 2 2 3
2 2 3 2 2 3
(b)
2 2 3 2
(c)
2 2 3 1 1 3 1 2
(d)
2 3 1 3 1 2
2
1 1 1( ) ( , , ) ( , , , )
1 1( , , , ) ( , , )
1 ( , , , )
1 ( , , , ) ( , , )]
1 ( , , ) ( , )]
1 (
N N
N N
N
N N
N N
N
H K H K M X F H K L M X F
N N N
H K M X F L H L M X F
N N
H K M X F L
N
H K M X F L H K M X F
N
H K X F L H K X F
N
H K X
N
 

 
  
  
   
  
  
    
    
 3 1 3 1 2
1 3 2 3 1 2
(e)
1 1
1, 1 2, 1 3 2, 1 2, 1 3 1 2
1
(f)
1, 2, 1 2
1
(g)
, , ) ( , , )]
1 [ ( ; , ) ( ; , , )]
1 [ ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , )]
1 [ ( ; , )] ( ; , )]
N
N N
N
i N i N
i i i i
i
N
i i i i i i i i
i
F L H K X F L
I K X F L I K X F L
N
I K X X X F L I K X X X F L
N
I S X U T I S X U T
N
  
  
  
  
 
 


   
    
    
    



1, 2,[ ( ; , )- ( ; , )]Q Q Q Q Q Q Q QI S X U T I S X U T     
where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from Fano’s inequality at user 2, (c) from Fano’s inequality at user 1, (d) 
from independence of 1 2( , )M M  from other random variables, (e) from Lemma 3 (in which the random variable 2F is set 
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to be constant), (f) from definition of the random variables U ,S ,T as above and (g) from definition of the random 
variable Q as above and setting 1 2       .  
Following the same approach, upper bounds for 2R  can be deduced and so Theorem 4 is proved for some random 
variables with distribution 1 2 3 3 1 2 3( , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , )p u s t x x x p u s t p s t x p x x x which form Markov chains as 3U S X  and 
3U T X  . 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a source model for secret key generation were studied in which each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a 
secret key with user 3 where user 1 acts as a wiretapper for user 2 and vice versa. Three users could observe i.i.d outputs of 
correlated sources and there is a public channel between users. In the described model, the forward and backward key 
strategies were considered based on the direction of the public channel, i.e., from users 1 and 2 to user 3 or in the reverse 
direction. For both the forward and backward key strategies, inner and outer bounds of secret key capacity regions were 
derived. Our results also include the results of previous works such as  [1]. Our upper and lower bounds did not coincide 
generally but some special cases were considered where these bounds were tight.   
As the continuation of this work, we are now exploring a model similar to the described model but instead of the public 
channel, there is a generalized multiple access channel (MAC) between the terminals, where users 1 and 2 govern the 
inputs of the MAC and outputs are received by users 1, 2 and 3. Also as the future works, we can suggest the same 
problem of this paper for the situation where there is a two-way public channel i.e., from users 1 and 2 to user 3 and vice 
versa. Also unlimited usage of the public channel can be viewed as a generalization of the problem.  
APPENDIX 
A. LEMMA 1 
For sufficiently large N and sufficiently small 1  , we have:  
2 2 1( , ) ( , )
N N NNH S X U H S X U N    
Proof:  We use the indicator function: 
20
( )
2 , ,
2
1,       ( , , ) ( )
( , , )
0,                                    otherwise
N N N N
S X Us x u A Ps x u    
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We have: 
2 2( ; , ) ( , ; , )
N N N N N NI S X U I S X U  
and hence: 
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( , ; , ) ( ) ( , ; , )
( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
( ) ( 1) ( ; , 1) ( 0) ( ; , 0) ( ; , )
N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
H S X U H S I S X U NH S I S X U
NH S I S X U I X U
NH S P I S X U P I S X U I X U
 
 
    
   
  
       
 
We analyze the above terms one by one. 
For the second term: 
20
( )
2 2 , , 0( 1) ( ; , 1) [( , , ) ( )]log log
N N N N N N N
S X UP I S X U NP s x u A P N          
For the third term: 
( )
2 , ,20
2 2
2 2 2
( , , ) ( )
2 2 0 2 0
( 0) ( ; , 0) ( ; , 0)
( , , )[log ( , , ) log ( ) log ( , )]
( ( ) ( , ) ( , , ) 3 ) ( ( ; , ) 3 )
NN N N
S X U
N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N
s x u A P
P I S X U I S X U
P s x u P s x u P s P x u
N H S H X U H S X U N I S X U

  
 

   
  
      
  
For the forth term: 
2( ; , ) ( ) 1
N NI X U H    
Finally, we can deduce: 
1
2 0 2 0 2 0 0
1( , ) ( ) log ( ( ; , ) 3 ) 1 ( ( , ) ( log 3 ))N N NH S X U NH S N N I S X U N H S X U
N

   

           

 
B. LEMMA 2 
For sufficiently large N  and sufficiently small 2  , in the forward key strategy, we have: 
2 2( , , , )
N N NH S K X K U N   
Proof: For fixed k and k  , we assume that user 1 transmits a codeword , ,Nk k ks   where 11 2NRk  , 11 2NRk    and  
11 2NRk    . First, we show that user 2 can decode , ,Nk k ks   with sufficiently small probability of error if it has access to 
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 sequences 2, , ,N Nk k x u . User 2 selects k  so that: 
23
( )
, , 2 , ,( , , ) ( )
N N N
k k k S X Us x u A P    
if such k  exists and it is unique, otherwise we declare error. With the assumption that , ,1Nk ks  is sent by user 1, error 
occurred when
23
( )
, ,1 2 , ,( , , ) ( )
N N N
k k S X Us x u A P   or when 23( ), , 2 , ,( , , ) ( )N N Nk k k S X Us x u A P   for 1k   . Due to joint AEP: 
23
( )
, ,1 2 , , 3(( , , ) ( ))
N N N
k k S X UP s x u A P      
and also: 
1 2 3 1 3
23
( ( ; , ) ( )( )
, , 2 , ,1
{( , , ) ( )} 2 2NR N I S X U NN N Nk k k S X UkP s x u A P
  

    
  
     
So, we can bound decoding error of user 2 as: 
1 3( )
3 2
N
eP
     
and by choosing 1 3max{ , } 0    , we can make eP sufficiently small. 
Now, we exploit Fano’s inequality to obtain: 
1 3[ ]
2 1 3 2 1 2
1 1 1 1( , , , ) [1 ] ( 2 )[ ( ; , ) ]NN N N eH S K X K U P R I S X UN N N N
              
C. LEMMA 3 
This lemma is a modified version of Lemma 1 in  [1]. 
For arbitrary random variables 1 2, ,K F F  and sequences of random variables 2 3,N NX X we have  [1]: 
1 1
3 2 1 2 1 2 3, 3,1 2, 1 1 2, 3,1 2, 1 1
1
[ ( ; , ) ( ; )] [ ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , )]
N
N N i N i N
i i i i
i
I K X F F I K X F I K F X X X F I K X X X F  

          
Proof: First, we consider the right hand side of the above inequality: 
1 1 1
2 3, 3,1 2, 1 1 2, 3,1 2, 1 1 3,1 2, 1 3,1 2, 1 1 2
1 1
1
2,1 1 3,1 2, 1 1 3,1 2, 1 1 2 3,1 1 2
1
[ ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , )]= [ ( , , ) ( , , , )]
( , ) [ ( , , ) ( , , , )] ( , , )
N N
i N i N i N i N
i i i i i i
i i
N
N i N i N N
i i
i
I K F X X X F I K X X X F H K X X F H K X X F F
H K X F H K X X F H K X X F F H K X F F
  
  
 

 

 
   
 

1
2 3,1 1 2,1 1 2 3,1 2, 1 1 2 3,1 1 2,1 1
1
0
( ; , ) ( ; ) [ ( ; , , )] ( ; , ) ( ; )
N
N N i N N N
i
i
I K F X F I K X F I K F X X F I K F X F I K X F




    

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